



FORSCOM Leader's Safety Conference




24 October 2006
Atlanta, Georgia



Agenda

| <u>24 OCT 06</u> | <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>SPEAKER</u> |
|------------------|---|----------------------------|
| 0830-0840 | Welcome | LTG Campbell |
| 0840-0900 | Opening Remarks | LTG Campbell |
| 0900-0930 | FORSCOM 1st Qtr, FY 07 Risk Assessment | LTC McLean |
| 0930-1000 | Statistics Brief CONUS/OIF/OEF | LTC McLean |
| 1000-1015 | Break | |
| 1015-1045 | Lessons Learned - Iraq AMV Rollover | CPT Clifford, 101st AA Div |
| 1045-1130 | NCO Safety Responsibilities | CSM Carey |
| 1130-1230 | Lunch / view displays | |
| 1230-1300 | Case Study - POV | LTC Solomon, 3 ID |
| 1300-1400 | "Must Do's" / Composite Risk Management | BG Forrester |
| 1400-1430 | Case Study - Motorcycle Div | CPT Ashley, 82 A |
| 1430-1445 | Break | |
| 1445-1515 | Case Study - Negligent Discharge | CPT Babauta, 2 I |
| 1515-1600 | Open Discussion and Closing Remarks | GEN McNeill FORSCOM |

UNCLASSIFIED



Goal and Objectives

GOAL: To provoke thought, exchange ideas, discuss lessons learned and provide tools to leaders to prevent off-duty and on-duty accidents and eliminate fatalities.

OBJECTIVES:

- 1. To emphasize leader involvement in communicating the importance of risk reduction in the daily activities of Soldiers, civilians, and family members.**
- 2. To identify successful safety initiatives with emphasis on standards and discipline and to ensure we recognize the Soldiers and organizations that have safety programs that are reducing accidents and saving lives.**
- 3. To provide an opportunity to discuss redeployment behaviors and receive guidance and tools to identify at-risk Soldiers and assist returning troops and leaders.**
- 4. To review case studies of recent accidents within the command to identify causes and to provide ideas for prevention efforts.**
- 5. To share with leaders the FORSCOM Risk Assessment for 1st QTR**




Headquarters

United States Army Forces Command

FORSCOM 1st Quarter FY 07 Risk Assessment

Fort McPherson, GA



Historical & Analytical Summary

Findings

FY07

1st Qtr Major Concerns

- Significant reduction in FY06 overall accidental fatalities
- Surge in motorcycle accidents in FY06
- Negligent discharge incidents/fatalities show need for weapons training and increased awareness
- Army Motor Vehicle accidents involving rollovers add to loss totals
- Continued incidents of death due to undiagnosed medical conditions
- High OPTEMPO and repeated rotations stress units and individuals

• POV & Motorcycle Fatalities

• Weapons Handling

• Mobilization & Deployment

• Army Tactical Vehicle

Operations

• Redeployment &

Reconstitution


• Preventing Combat

Casualties

• Aviation Operations

• Training & Exercises


STANDARDS AND
DISCIPLINE




FORSCOM POV Fatalities

FY 2006

as of 18 SEP 06






Areas of Concern - Initial Risk

Areas of Concern

| Standards & Disciplines | POV & Motorcycle Operations | Extremely High Risk |
|-------------------------|--|---------------------|
| | Weapons Handling | Extremely High Risk |
| | Mobilization & Deployment | Extremely High Risk |
| | Army Tactical Vehicle Operations | Extremely High Risk |
| | Redeployment & Reconstitution | Extremely High Risk |
| | Preventing Combat Casualties | High Risk |
| | Aviation Operations | High Risk |
| | Training & Exercises | High Risk |
| | Transformation | High Risk |
| | | |



Low Risk




Moderate Risk



High Risk



Extremely High Risk



POV Operations - Other than Motorcycles

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Injury, disability or death
- Mission degradation/unit morale

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Speed/aggressive driving/boating
- Inexperience/lack of training
- Driving under the influence, drowsy or distracted
- Personal/family hardship
- Fall and winter driving weather
- Shorter periods of daylight
- Failure to wear seatbelts/floatation devices
- Post deployment purchases of high-performance vehicles

CONSIDERATIONS

- Leadership: helping Soldiers internalize their sense of self-worth
 - Command emphasis
 - First line leader interaction
 - Leader education
 - Commanders safety course
 - Additional Duty Safety course
 - Soldier Risk Index (SRI) POI
- All first-line leaders use SRI to identify and assist at-risk Soldiers
- Address at-risk behavior in training and counseling
 - Driving impaired, drowsy or distracted
- Aggressive driving
 - Failure to use seatbelts
- Review of leave/pass travel plans
 - Pre-leave risk assessment (ASMIS-2) mandatory
 - Vehicle safety inspection
- Brief seasonal driving hazards
- Maximize use of installation driver training programs
- Enforce revocations of driving privileges
- Comply with AR 600-8-4 (Para 2-6) in making line of duty determinations



POV Operations - Motorcycles

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Injury, disability or death
- Mission degradation
- Mission degradation/unit/family morale

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Increase in motorcycle use in temperate weather
- Inexperienced riders
 - Powerful/responsive motorcycle
 - Unfamiliarity with equipment
 - Lack of situational awareness
- Lack of protective equipment
- Hidden obstacles (potholes, road debris)
- Environmental conditions (weather, light, road surface, fog/mist)
- Mechanical issues (tires, lights, chain)
- Personal behaviors
 - Speed
 - Alcohol
 - Fatigue
 - "X-treme" driving (trick riding)
 - Driving beyond limitations

CONSIDERATIONS

- Leadership: helping Soldiers internalize their sense of self-worth
 - Command emphasis on identifying motorcycle riders in their command
 - First line leader interaction
 - Soldier Risk Index (SRI)
 - STOPP program
 - Vehicle inspections
 - Promote motorcycle awareness
- Enforce Motorcycle Safety Foundation basic course
- Develop mentorship programs
- Enforce licensing requirements and use of proper PPE
- Reinforce hazard avoidance basics
 - Adjust to weather & light conditions
 - Drive defensively - be aware of upcoming obstacles and vehicles
 - Avoid peak travel periods on high use roads
 - Avoid speed/alcohol/fatigue/X-treme riding/pushing limits



Weapons Handling

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Negligent Discharges
 - Lack of Training in Clearing & Handling Weapons
 - Horseplay
 - Experimentation
- Fatalities from use of Non-Standard Weapons and Ammunition

CONSIDERATIONS

- Train to Army standards for weapons clearing
- Inspect redeploying weapons systems and vehicles (SOUM 05-002)
- Leader engagement & enforcement of controls
- Pre-deployment review of weapons handling procedures
- Establish & disseminate rules of engagement & weapons status levels
- Current DA policy and guidance regarding non-standard ammunition and explosives

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Complacency
- Lack of familiarity with assigned weapons
- Muzzle control & awareness
- Increased OPTEMPO
- Increased access to weapons & ammunition
- Conflicting procedures in TMs & FMs



Mobilization & Deployment

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Vehicular accidents
- Rail head & port fatalities
 - Crushed by moving vehicles/equipment
 - Struck by falling objects/shifting cargo
 - Electrical fatalities
 - Drowning
 - Trips, slips, falls
- Physical exertion related injuries

CONSIDERATIONS

- Leader/NCO involvement
- Effective training
 - Rail head/port operations
 - Vehicle-specific driver certification
 - Convoy procedures
 - Electrical/fire safety
 - Physical conditioning
 - Drown proofing
- Positive control of convoy movement
- Train and enforce weather hazards and mitigation
- Well-established rear detachment
- Distribution of lessons learned

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- High OPTEMPO
- Transition to unfamiliar vehicles & equipment
- Limited collective & individual training opportunities
- Acclimatization & physical conditioning
- Leader shortages
- Integration issues
- Fall and winter weather



Army Tactical Vehicle


POTENTIAL RISKS Operations CONSIDERATIONS

- Injury, disability or death
 - Lower unit morale
 - Loss of combat power/vehicles are not mission capable
- In theater vehicle rollover accidents
- Collisions with civilian vehicles/local nationals/pedestrians

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Inadequate enforcement of standards
- Inexperience/inadequate training
 - Insufficient vehicle-specific training
 - Inadequate driver training facilities
- Driver attitudes & behavior
 - Speed
 - Fatigue
- Up-Armor kits add weight, changes the center of gravity & handling characteristics
- Poor road conditions
- Off road maneuvering
- Purchasing non-Army approved equipment instead of using Army approved

- Leader/NCO involvement at all levels
- Execute effective driver training
 - To standards in AR 600-55
 - Increase supervised driving time with NCOs as TC/VC for inexperienced driver
 - Pursue driving range improvements and training with up-armored HMMWVs in CONUS/OCONUS
 - Stage HMMWV Egress Assistance Trainers (HEAT) for use at CTCs, Mob Sites and major troop installations
 - Train & rehearse rollover drills
- Enforce rest cycles IAW AR 385-55
- NCOs lead by example & enforce strict speed limit compliance
- M1114 UAHMMWV Combined Safety Smart Card
- Do not purchase non-Army-approved equipment (example TACOM SOUM 06-12 “Operational” Cooper Sling Seat affects all M1114 Up-Armored HMMWVs) for vehicles



Redeployment & Reconstitution

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Increased fatalities due to:
 - Complacency & reintegration stressors
 - Fatigue
 - Soldier at risk behavior
- Perceived invincibility - increased acceptance of personal risk
- Inadequate rear detachment controls
- Losing sight of mission and standards

CONSIDERATIONS

- Leaders participate in redeployment counseling sessions for Soldiers/families
- Positive control by a dedicated rear detachment commander with a concerned staff
- Deployment Cycle Support (DCS): ensure block training is allotted for risk management
- Post placement programs for marital and mental health counseling should be encouraged
- Required post-deployment decompression period

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Reintegration with family/job
- Use of deployment earnings on high performance machines and risky recreational activities
- Adverse weather conditions
- Personnel turn-over
- Post Traumatic Stress



Preventing Combat Casualties

POTENTIAL RISKS

- Exposure to hostile forces
- Improvised Explosive Devices
- Acceptance of unnecessary risk to complete the mission
- Injury or death due to poor physical condition/undiagnosed conditions
- Mission degradation


CONSIDERATIONS

- Ensure leaders are trained to use Composite Risk Management
- Conduct effective counter-IED training
 - Update IED briefings to meet evolving threat
 - OIF IED Smart Card
 - TIED2 Simulator
- Conduct multi-level training/preparation for ALL convoys & off-base operations
 - Issue intelligence briefing
 - Conduct reconnaissance & security
 - Perform risk/vulnerability analysis
 - Rehearse and conduct contact battle drills at individual, squad/team, and unit level.
 - Enforce use of Army approved body armor (TACOM SOUM 06-17)
- Train and rehearse rollover drills
- Ordnance disposal performed only by qualified EOD personnel or Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agents (EOCA)

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Inadequate unit level risk management
- Fluid OPTEMPO
- Inexperience or lack of training
 - Weapon systems & equipment
 - Tactical driving/egress under fire
 - Evolving enemy weapons and tactics
- Lack of situational awareness
- Stress, fatigue & a failure to properly hydrate
- Environmental conditions - roads, weather etc.
- Personnel turnover & infrequent CTT





Aviation Operations

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Crashes/hard landings resulting in fatalities
- Inability to accomplish the mission
- Increase in accidental losses
- Loss of Pre/Post deployment training time
- Loss of currency and proficiency in aviation operations
- Noncompliance with established procedures
- **Ineffective use** of proper crew coordination elements and principles
- Stress and fatigue
- Indecisiveness when reacting/responding to unexpected situations

CONSIDERATIONS

- **Require a “By the Book” approach to all tasks and activities**
- Prioritize mission requirements
- **Implement Enhanced Crew Coordination program and employ proper crew mix**
- Select experienced supervisory personnel for management of all maintenance tasks
- Maintain continuity of all training programs
- **Ensure risk management principles are also applied to off duty activities**
- Maximize coordination and use of local aero medical resources
- Analyze/disseminate lessons learned from accident reports and near misses
- Reevaluate crew endurance program and allow time for personal recovery
- **Give wide dissemination to success stories**
- Match training to environmental and weather conditions
- Reassess briefing officer, pilot in command and non-rated crewmember selection and training
- Implement flight regulations and procedures refresher training programs

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Unexpected weather changes
- Personnel and equipment shortages
- High maintenance demands
 - Deferred maintenance
 - RESET program
 - Parts availability
- ARFORGEN Implementation
- Task/Organizational Changes
 - High personnel turn over
 - Inexperience



Training & Exercises

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Personal Injuries
 - Physical conditioning/acclimatization
 - Knowledge/familiarity of weapons systems and equipment
- Military vehicle accidents
 - Vehicle rollovers/convoy ops
 - Soldier proficiency in heavier vehicle, battle gear, and seatbelts
 - Desert terrain/sand storm ops
- NTC & JRTC fatalities
 - Realistic training/live-fire operations
 - Light-heavy combined operations
- CONUS/OCONUS port and rail ops

CONSIDERATIONS

- Physical screening/Readiness
- Mandatory pre-deployment weapons immersion training
- DOD approved driver training for all drivers, co-drivers and vehicle commanders
- Mission rehearsals & risk assessments for CTC rotations & exercises
- Review, acceptance and mitigation of risk at appropriate level for all operations
- Review and rehearse convoy ops and train convoy commanders
- Full battle gear and seatbelts worn during all operations.
- Leaders present for verification and documentation of all training
- Inclusion of USAR Army Safety Augmentation Detachment assets

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Non-standard pre-deployment training
- Inexperience with newly fielded vehicles, equipment, and weapons
- Non-school trained vehicle operators
- Minimal training available at CRCs
- Composite Risk Management not incorporated in training



Transformation

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Lack of familiarity with new missions, organization & equipment
- Safety staffing shortfalls in supporting new organizational structure
- ~~Manning shortfalls in RC units preclude filling all slots in modular organization~~

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Rapid pace of change
- Transformation concurrent with war-time missions
- Resource availability
 - Personnel & equipment
 - Training time/resources

CONSIDERATIONS

- Interview and hire safety specialists against FY07 authorizations
- Mandate required safety training for Commanders and additional duty safety officers
- Continue to conduct new equipment training
- Ensure sufficient time/resources to adequately train personnel
- Leaders thoroughly study & examine new TTPs -integrate system safety measures
- Integrate BCT level safety specialist into all operations



Standards and Discipline

POTENTIAL RISKS


- Composite Risk Management not consistently understood and used
 - Safety not prioritized or emphasized
 - Standards known but not enforced
 - Risk decisions not elevated to appropriate level
- Task completion using non-standard means
 - Less than required personnel available
 - Insufficient equipment or resources
 - Insufficient time
 - Absence of leader supervision
- Fatigue affecting adherence to standard
- Soldiers and leaders ignore known risk
- Competing training priorities and fielding of new equipment

CONSIDERATIONS

- Command emphasis in hazard identification during unit training and operations
- Command clarification of acceptable risk levels and authority
- First line supervisor involvement in all activities
- **Commanders must comply with the list of "MUST DO's" located on the CRC website under the Commanders Corner banner.**
- NCO Loss Prevention Leadership Program
 - Safety bullets on evaluations mandatory
 - Commander's Safety Course mandatory for CSM/SGM/1SG/MSG
 - Individual Risk Index training for all Soldiers
 - Brigade CSMs conduct fatality review boards
- Execute mission by unit SOP
- Apply Composite Risk Management (including the STOPP Program) to all on and off duty activities
- Compliance with revocation of on-post driving privileges IAW AR 190-5
- Compliance with AR 600-8-4 in Line of Duty determinations

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Some Leaders/NCOs have not taken the online Commander's Safety Course and or the Additional Duty Safety Course.



Areas of Concern - Residual Risk

| Standards & Discipline | Initial Risk | Residual Risk After Controls Added |
|------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------|
| | Ex Hig | Hig h |
| | Hig h | Mod |
| | Hig h | Mod |
| | Hig h | Mod |



Low Risk



Moderate Risk



High Risk




Extremely High Risk



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
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Commander's 1st Quarter FY 07 Goal

Focus the efforts of leaders at all levels to influence Soldier behavior and dramatically reduce accidental fatalities in the following areas:

- Motorcycles/ATVs
- Privately Owned Vehicles
- Weapons Handling/Negligent discharges
- Army Motor Vehicles/Combat Vehicles
- Aviation




End State

The continued ability to press the fight to the enemy by employing innovative tactics and dynamic execution while accepting minimal adverse risk.

- Leaders promoting the incorporation of Composite Risk Management practices into both work and home activities
- Risk acceptance decisions are made and held accountable at the proper level
- Integrate safety and risk management principles into task planning,
preparation and execution



FORSCOM Fatalities FY02-06




| FY | Accident s | Fatalitie s |
|--------------------|------------|-------------|
| 01 | 1027 | 69 |
| 02 | 878 | 101 |
| 03 | 498 | 78 |
| 04 | 583 | 92 |
| 05 | 567 | 106 |
| 06 | 437 | 80 |
| 6 y r avg | 665 | 88 |

FY06 Total = 80



FORSCOM Accidental Fatalities FY02-06




POV = Privately Owned Vehicle AMV = Army Motor Vehicle ACV= Army Combat Vehicle

PI= Personal Injury AOV = Army Operated Vehicle




FORSCOM Sedan/SUV Fatalities

20 Drivers




19 of 20 drivers were “driving reckless” - no seatbelt, fatigued, speeding, under the influence, etc.


15 Passengers



All 15 passengers were “riding reckless” - no seatbelt, fatigued driver, driver was speeding, etc.



FORSCOM Motorcycle/ATV Fatalities




- **Reckless Behavior:** speeding, improper passing, DUI, no helmet
- **Hit by:** neither confirmed MSF, one with helmet - one without, one had motorcycle endorsement on his license, one did not

| | Yes | No | Not Reported |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| MSF Graduate | 12 (46%) | 11 (42%) | 3 (12%) |
| License | 16 (62%) | 10 (38%) | 0 (0%) |
| Helmet/PPE | 17 (65%) | 8 (31%) | 1 (4%) |



FORSCOM Personal Injury Fatalities



- Three soldiers died during PT
- Three soldiers were shot with negligent discharges
- Two Soldiers died in sports - one drowned fishing, one was jet-skiing and struck by a boat
- Two Soldiers died under the influence of alcohol - one walking in traffic, one walked into a large fan
- One Soldier died when he landed hard during a parachute jump






FY06 FORSCOM Fatalities


FORSCOM CONUS vs. FORSCOM DEPLOYED

CONUS: 80
FORSCOM Soldiers Died



84%
of FORSCOM
Fatalities are from
POVs and Army
Vehicles

OIF/OEF Deployed: 54
FORSCOM Soldiers Died



54%
are from Army
Vehicles



FY 2006 FORSCOM Fatalities Summary

FORSCOM had 80 accidental fatalities in FY 2006, down from 106 fatalities in FY 2005. There were 63 POV fatalities - 26 motorcycle, 24 sedan, 11 truck and 2 ATV accidents. Six of the 11 Personal Injury fatalities were sports oriented and three were negligent discharges. Fifteen percent of the FORSCOM fatalities were USARC and Title 10 NG soldiers. Eight of those 12 USARC and Title 10 NG soldiers were mobilized for CONUS contingency operations. Fifty-four FORSCOM soldiers died OCONUS in accidents supporting OIF and OEF - 22 of them in HMMWV accidents.





101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)



FATAL ACCIDENT REVIEW M1114 Rollover

**COMBAT PATROL
FOR WIA/ KIA**



AGENDA

MISSION

ACCIDENT INFORMATION

REVIEW OF DECEASED SOLDIER'S PERSONAL INFORMATION

ACCIDENT SYNOPSIS

ACCIDENT LOCATION & SITE DIAGRAM

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

POST ACCIDENT

FINDINGS / RECOMMENDATIONS /ANALYSIS



MISSION

THE UNIT WAS CONDUCTING A ROUTINE COMBAT PATROL.

THREE M1114s HEADING FROM FOB HEIDER TO FOB GRIZZLY TO PICK UP DINNER FOR THE SECTION AND THE MITT THAT WAS STATIONED AT FOB HEIDER.



ACCIDENT INFORMATION



**UNIT: B TROOP, 1-32 CAV, 101ST ABN DIV (AA)
(OPCON TO 3 HBCT-4TH ID)**

EQUIPMENT: M1114 UP-ARMORED HMMWV

DATE/TIME: 2 FEB 06, 1759 HOURS

LOCATION: DIYALA PROVINCE, BAQUBAH, IRAQ

INJURIES:

1 FATALITY - PFC MESSE

3 INJURED - SFC WENZELL, SPC CATALDI & IRAQI

INTERPRETER

COST: \$40,163.61



SOLDIER INFORMATION



**NAME: MESSER SCOTT ANTHONY
(DECEASED)**

RANK: PFC

MOS: 19D10

AGE: 26

SEX: MALE



SOLDIER INFORMATION

DEPENDENTS: MARRIED WITH TWO DAUGHTERS

CHARACTERIZATION:

OUTSTANDING SOLDIER WITH A HIGH LEVEL OF MOTIVATION AND DETERMINATION. RECENT AIR ASSAULT SCHOOL GRADUATE AND EARNED HIS PRESTIGIOUS CAVALRY SPURS.

MOST RECENT DEPLOYMENT: OIF (SEP 05-FEB 06)

PREVIOUS INCIDENTS:

NO PRIOR INCIDENTS OR NEGATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS



ACCIDENT SYNOPSIS



AT APPROXIMATELY 021759FEB06, THREE M1114S WERE CONDUCTING A ROUTINE COMBAT PATROL FROM FOB HEIDER TO FOB GRIZZLY TO PICK UP DINNER FOR THE SECTION AND THE MITT THAT WAS STATIONED AT FOB HEIDER.

PATROL APPROACHED CHECKPOINT 1 (CP1) AT 40 TO 50 MPH.

THE CREW IN THE LEAD M1114 FAILED TO SLOW DOWN WHILE APPROACHING CP1.

- THE LEAD M1114 CREW IDENTIFIED AN ONCOMING CIVILIAN VEHICLE APPROACHING THE COMBAT PATROL WITH HIGH BEAMS.
- THE LEAD M1114 DRIVER FLASHED HIS HEADLIGHTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO SIGNAL THE ONCOMING CIVILIAN VEHICLE TO LOWER HIS LIGHTS.




ACCIDENT SYNOPSIS



- THE LEAD M1114 DRIVER WAS BLINDED BY THE HEADLIGHTS OF THE ONCOMING CIVILIAN VEHICLE AND SWERVED, HITTING A CONCRETE BARRIER AT CP1, CAUSING THE M1114 TO ROLLOVER.
- THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED DURING LOW LIGHT CONDITIONS AND THE BARRIER WAS NOT MARKED WITH REFLECTIVE TAPE.
- THE PRE-CONVOY CHECKLIST HAD THE SPEED NOT TO EXCEED 40 MPH.



ACCIDENT LOCATION



VIEW OF THE VEHICLE CRASH SITE, ACCIDE

H SITE, MARKS THE LOCATION OF ACCIDENT.




ACCIDENT SITE DIAGRAM

IRAQI CHECK POINT

1

N →





ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

THUR 02 FEB 06




HAZE

*Mostly Cloudy
Afternoon
T-storms*

59/37

WIND:15-30 KTS

G 40 KTS





ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS (CONT.)

WEATHER EFFECTS

| | 31 JAN | 01 FEB | 02 FEB | 03 FEB | 04 |
|------------|--------|--------|----------|--------|----|
| ILLUM DATA | | | | | |
| AIR | | | V VTU | VTU | V |
| ASSAULT | | | V | V | V |
| HELO LIFT | | | VTU | TU | V |
| MEDEVAC | | W | W VWCVWP | CVWP | V |
| UAV | | V | V VCC | VCC | V |
| HIGH RECON | | V | V VCC | VCC | V |
| LOW RECON | | | V | V | V |
| ARMOR | | | P | P | |
| PERSONNEL | V | | V | V | V |
| CAS | W | | W VV W | W | V |
| MANEUVER | | | | | |

W - WIND

CC - CLOUD COVER

TU - TURBULENCE

P - PRECIPITATION

TS - THUNDERSTO

V - VISIBILITY

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS: DID CONTRIBUTE, DARK AND DIM.



POST-ACCIDENT (02/02/06)

1800 THE CONVOY STOPPED AND CREWS EXIT VEHICLES.

1801 SECURITY ESTABLISHED.

1802 SECOND VEHICLE CREW BEGAN CHECKING THE SOLDIERS FOR INJURIES.

1804 TC CALLED AIR MEDEVAC WITH A GRID BUT BFT WAS MALFUNCTIONING.

1814 TC RE-SENT NEW GRID FOR AIR MEDEVAC FROM ANOTHER VEHICLE BFT THAT SHOWED UP AT THE SCENE.

1849 AIR MEDEVAC ARRIVED.



FINDINGS

THE CREW OF THE LEAD M1114 FAILED TO SLOW DOWN WHILE APPROACHING CP1 (APPROXIMATE SPEED 40-50 MPH). THE PRE-CONVOY CHECKLIST HAD THE SPEED NOT TO EXCEED 40 MPH.

THE LEAD M1114 CREW IDENTIFIED AN ONCOMING CIVILIAN VEHICLE APPROACHING THE COMBAT PATROL WITH HIGH BEAMS.

THE DRIVER FLASHED HIS HEADLIGHTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO SIGNAL THE ONCOMING VEHICLE TO LOWER HIS LIGHTS.

THE DRIVER WAS BLINDED BY THE HEADLIGHTS OF THE ONCOMING CIVILIAN VEHICLE AND SWERVED, HITTING A CONCRETE BARRIER AT CP1, CAUSING THE M1114 TO ROLLOVER.

THE GUNNER WAS NOT ABLE TO CONDUCT ROLLOVER DRILL POSSIBLY BECAUSE THE GUNNER STRAP HAD BEEN MODIFIED WITH A WIDER PADDED SEAT. THE GUNNER'S TURRET WAS A MACHINE SHOP PRODUCTION WHICH CRUSHED DURING THE ROLLOVER SEQUENCE PINNING THE GUNNER.



GUNNER SLING SEAT **MODIFIED**




THE GUNNER STRAP WAS MODIFIED WITH A WIDER PADDED SEAT POSSIBLY PREVENTING ROLLOVER DRILL EXECUTION.

NOTE: THE PASSENGER SEAT IN THIS PHOTO WAS REMOVED FROM ITS MOUNTED POSITION AFTER THE ACCIDENT. IT WAS NOT IN THE CURRENT POSITION DURING THE ACCIDENT.



GUNNER SLING SEAT **MODIFIED**



**UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION ON THE GUNNER
SLING SEAT!**



GUNNER TURRET SHIELD FABRICATED D

CRASHED VEHICLE



GUNNER TURRET SHIELD
MISSING.

FABRICATED SHIELD
EXAMPLE



THE TURRET THAT WAS ON THE CRASHED
VEHICLE WAS A FABRICATED WELDED SHIELD.



FINDINGS

A COMPANY LEVEL RISK ASSESSMENT WAS COMPLETED IN WRITING

BUT NOT APPROVED AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF COMMAND.



RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMEND SOP CHANGES REQUIRING CONVOYS TO SLOW TO 5 MPH WHEN APPROACHING, ENTERING, AND TRaversing A CHECKPOINT.

**RECOMMEND THAT DRIVERS AND ASSISTANCE DRIVERS TAKE THE ON LINE ACCIDENT AVOIDANCE COURSE (
[HTTPS://CRC.ARMY.MIL](https://crc.army.mil)) AND THAT VEHICLE CREWS EXECUTE ROLLOVER DRILLS PRIOR TO MISSIONS.**

ENSURE ALL GUNNERS SLING SEATS ARE THE APPROPRIATE DA APPROVED SEAT.

REPLACE ALL MACHINE SHOP MADE GUNNER TURRETS WITH APPROPRIATE DA APPROVED MANUFACTURE MADE TURRETS.

REINFORCE THE STANDARDS OF COMPLETING COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEETS WITH REVIEW AND APPROVAL AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF COMMAND.



GUNNER TURRET SHIELD APPROVED



**RECOMMEND THAT VEHICLES WITH FABRICATED
OR EARLY VERSION SHIELDS BE REPLACED
IMMEDIATELY WITH APPROVED SHIELDS.**



ANALYSIS

COMMAND FACTORS: DID NOT CONTRIBUTE.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS : CONTRIBUTED, DARK AND DIM.

MATERIEL FACTORS : DID NOT CONTRIBUTE.

HUMAN FACTORS : CONTRIBUTED, INDIVIDUAL FAILURE.



QUESTIONS

FORSCOM

Leaders' Safety

Conference

Meeting


24 October 2006

CSM Dennis M. Carey



Noncommissioned Officer

Loss Prevention Leadership Program



“US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has experienced consecutive increases in accidental Soldier fatalities for the last two years. This tragic trend has continued despite the efforts of leaders across the command. Our NCO Corps must attack this problem to preserve our combat power. Every NCO must understand that ensuring the responsible behavior of Soldiers is an essential professional duty.”

--General Dan K. McNeill


CSA Sends


In March 2003, the Secretary of Defense challenged the Services to reduce accidents by 50% by the end of FY05. Our target was 101 mishap fatalities, but we actually suffered 302 Soldier deaths due to accidents. These losses represent a significant impact on our combat power, and many could have been prevented with good leadership.

In the most dangerous environments - those in theater - we have a much reduced accident rate relative to the exposure levels. This is due to involved, engaged leaders who properly plan and then closely supervise their Soldiers' missions. Leaders are the key to preventing unnecessary loss. In recognition of this fact, we are strengthening the performance evaluation system on leader responsibility for risk management.

All leaders will include safety programs and tasks in their evaluation report support forms and counseling sessions.

We can't afford to let this become a "check the box" requirement.







Responsibilities

Every FORSCOM Command Sergeant Major will:

- **Ensure that every Soldier receives safety/risk management training, to include the STOPP Program familiarization, and it is annotated in their records**
- **Ensure that all NCOs understand and make effective use of the Soldier Risk Index (SRI). This product will assist all NCOs, beginning with first line leaders, in assessing Soldiers' personal hazards and implementing controls to mitigate risk.**
- **Implement and report completion of the NCO safety training program**






NCO Safety Training Program

- **Platoon Sergeants will complete the Additional Duty Safety Course within 60 days of assuming position and provide a copy of their certificate of completion to the first CSM in the NCO support channel. Certificates will be made a part of the NCO's training records.**






NCO Safety Training Program

- **First Sergeants/Master Sergeants and Command Sergeants Major/Sergeants Major will complete the on-line Commander's Safety Course within 60 days of assuming duty. A copy of the certificate will be provided to the next CSM in the NCO support channel and a copy will be added to their training records. Units may be required to produce the training certificates during periodic inspections or during the conduct of an accident investigation.**





NCO Safety Training Program

- The Command Sergeants Major of each FORSCOM Major Subordinate Command (MSC) and Separate Brigade will provide their certificate of completion for the Commander's Safety Course, along with a signed statement that the NCOs subordinate to them have completed the requisite safety training, to the FORSCOM G1 Safety Office. The information will be kept on file in the Safety Office, with a formal report provided to the FORSCOM CSM on a quarterly basis.





MUSTANGS!

Case Study—POV

SPC Prince, Benjamin
HHT, 6/8 CAV, 4th BDE, 3ID





Agenda

- Context of the Accident
- Accident Summary
- Risk Mitigation in Place
- Recommendations for the Future



Context of the Accident

- Unit held a ball to celebrate return from OIF
- Squadron ball took place in Savannah, GA (approx 40 miles from post) and was free to troopers; many civilians placed large amounts on bar tabs for the troopers
- SPC Prince was identified as drinking underage a week before the accident
- The hotel did not actively “card” troopers



Context of the Accident

- As SPC Prince entered the ball location his first line leader and another NCO ordered him not to consume alcohol
- SPC Prince was seen consuming alcohol through the night
- When observed by the Troop Commander, the Commander orders SPC Prince's chain of command to take the alcohol, escort him from the hotel, and ensure that he is driven by a designated driver back to Fort Stewart



Context of the Accident

- The leader eventually delegates this task to another trooper who claimed to be sober
- This second trooper takes SPC Prince's keys
- On the way to the car, SPC Prince grabs the lanyard attached to his keys and takes them back
- The “driver” does not physically resist and goes with SPC Prince to his car



Context of the Accident

- SPC Prince drives the vehicle out of the hotel with the other trooper in the passenger seat
- Within a mile, the passenger convinces SPC Prince to stop the car and grabs the transmission lever
- SPC Prince yelled at his passenger and told him to get out of the car
- The passenger acquiesced—SPC Prince drove off



Accident Summary

- SPC Benjamin Prince was killed while driving southbound in the northbound lane of I-95 when the POV he was operating was struck head-on by a tractor trailer at 004801APR06
- SPC Prince was intoxicated at the time of death (BAC unknown)



Risk Mitigation in Place

- Troop Safety Stand down the day prior focused on DUI, especially in light of the squadron ball the next night
- Squadron NCOPD regarding many safety subjects, especially DUI and placed in context of the ball
- SCO and SCSM warned all of the risk during their remarks at the Ball
- Transportation back to Fort Stewart after the ball provided
- Reduced-rate hotel rooms available nearby



Additional Risk Mitigation to Consider

- Have soft drinks available at the tables
- Do not serve alcohol at all
- Use an easily identifiable form of ID for those of age (e.g. bracelet)
- Do not allow “bar tabs”
- Breathalyzer at exits
- “Key check”
- Do not have “all ranks” balls



Conclusion

- This accident was avoidable
- More complete and comprehensive risk mitigation could have helped prevent this accident
- A sense of “invincibility” was also a likely contributor



Enhancing Combat Readiness through **COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT**

BG Bill Forrester

Commanding General U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center
Director of Army Safety





**KNOW
THE
EDGE**


own the
EDGE

Composite Risk Management



U.S. ARMY COMBAT READINESS CENTER
<https://crc.army.mil>

Soldier Accidental Fatalities





We are losing Soldiers in accidents every 34 hours. When we take a holistic look at Soldier fatalities—combat & non-combat—we find a Soldier dies every 11 hours.

“If a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower




“If a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it.”


Dwight D. Eisenhower

FY06 Soldier Accidental Fatalities


Total Army: 243




Everywhere Else: 175



USCENTCOM: 68



FY06 Soldier Accidental Fatalities




From the Field

- Composite Risk Management is not taught. “We lack adequate training.” MTT
- Coaching subordinates and “Oak Tree Counseling” really works. USASC Surveys in USAREUR
- Message stops at e-mail. DAIG
- Marketing Analysis: Safety is a Four Letter Word. “I don’t want to hear the word. I tune it out.” Focus Group (PARIO)



CSA's Composite Risk Management Guidance

- Culture**
- Climate**
- Leader Accountability & Involvement**
- Executable Plans**



What's Not Happening?

Message is not reaching
Junior Leader/Individual
Soldier Level

How Do We Influence the action?

- Own the Edge! Campaign
- Data Warehouse/Digital Tools
- Sharing Best Practices





Where's the Risk?

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT



**IED
Small Arms
RPG**

**Air
Ground
Driving**

Risk Management

Risk Management

**Successful
Risk
Management**

**What's going to kill me & my buddies,
Enemy or Accident?**

**M
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A
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C
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D**

LEADING ON THE EDGE

- Leaders stay engaged
- Leaders are accountable
- Someone always knows
- Never leave a fallen comrade

Coaching Composite Risk Management

Commander's Corner

ASMIS2 - POV
ASMIS1 - AIR, GROUND
CR University

Accident Reporting
Automation System
(ARAS)

Preliminary Loss Report (PLR)
Got Risk? Posters

Motorcycle Mentorship Program

Lost Reporting
Automated System (LRAS)

Accident Avoidance Course

Risk Management Information System (RMIS)


CRC Publications:
Flightfax
Countermeasure
Impax

Army Readiness Assessment Program (ARAP)

Career
Program -12

Composite Risk Management
Integration

Aviation Safety Training Division



John Cena video

GROUND


Trends

- Non-Hostile Weapons Related Injuries
- M1114 Rollovers
- Not Wearing Seatbelts


Initiatives

- Negligent Discharge Working Group
- Rollover Alert Device Concept Testing
- HEAT
- PM HMMWV Safety Upgrades

Everywhere Else: 175



USCENTCOM: 68





GENERAL SUPPORT CENTER-EUROPE

HMMWV Egress Assistance Trainer



CSM Butler Video

DRIVING - An Army Life Skill

Trends


Motorcycles

- 2/3 of fatalities E-5 & above
- No PPE, no training, no license
- 40% of total POV fatalities

POV

- Excessive speed, no seatbelts
- Alcohol related decreasing


Everywhere Else: 175



Initiatives

- ASMIS2, POV Risk Assessment
- Army Traffic Safety Training Program
- Motorcycle Mentorship Program
- Updating AR 385-55, Prevention of Motor Vehicle Accidents
- Database of Record, AMV/POV license
- Driving Centers of Excellence
 - HMMWV Driving Ranges
 - Simulations

USCENTCOM: 68




As of 01 Oct 06

Why Motorcycle Mentorship?

Trends

- 40 Soldiers died in motorcycle accidents in FY05 compared to 22 in FY04, an 82 percent increase
- 2/3 of FY06 Soldier fatalities involved E5's & above & 2/3 were over the age of 25
- 16 fatalities elected to disregard requirement to wear proper PPE & 12 had no formal motorcycle training
- Nationwide motorcycle sales on the rise
 - 230,000 in 1997
 - 734,000 in 2004
- Increase in OCONUS AAFES motorcycle sales to Soldiers since FY01 – 3263 sold in FY04. Through July of this year 1763 Harley's have been sold & AAFES is projecting total sales of 3200 units this FY



Initiatives

- **Motorcycle Mentorship Program**
 - USAF had a 50% reduction over 6-month BETA Test
 - Informal clubs already exist in our Army. We are missing a direct link to our riders.
- **USACRC developed MMP Webpage**
- **IMA funded motorcycle rider training at installations**
- **IMA contractor for the Army Traffic Safety Training Program (ATSTP) has surge capability to handle training for new riders**

Fatal POV Motorcycle Accidents *

01 Oct 05 - 30 Sep 06

| Motorcycle | Type | Total |
|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Buell | Sport | 1 |
| Harley Davidson | Standard | 3 |
| Harley Davidson 1450 cc | Cruiser | 1 |
| Harley Davidson Road King | Cruiser | 1 |
| Harley Davidson Custom Sportster | Cruiser | 1 |
| Honda | Standard | 1 |
| Honda VTX 1800 | Sport | 1 |
| Honda BR100 | Standard | 1 |
| Honda CBR | Sport | 4 |
| Honda CBR 600 | Sport | 1 |
| Honda CBR 600 F4I | Sport | 1 |
| Honda RC51 | Sport | 1 |
| Honda Shadow vt 1100 | Sport | 1 |
| Honda VTX 1300 | Sport | 1 |
| Honda x13 | Standard | 1 |
| Kawasaki Ninja | Sport | 1 |
| Kawasaki ZX-10 | Sport | 1 |
| Kawasaki ZX9R | Sport | 1 |

Statistics
 Total Accidents: 48
 Total Fatalities: 48
 Day: 20 Night: 28

Standards Violations
 No Helmet: 15
 No License: 10
 No MSF Course: 12

| | | |
|------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| Kawasaki zx10r | Sport | 1 |
| Kawasaki Concours | Sport | 1 |
| Ninja 636 | Sport | 1 |
| Suzuki | Standard | 1 |
| Suzuki Banditt 1200 | Sport | 1 |
| Suzuki GSX 1300 RK6 Hayabusa | Sport | 1 |
| Suzuki GSXR 750 | Sport | 1 |
| Suzuki GSX R600 | Sport | 1 |
| Suzuki Katana 600 | Sport | 1 |
| Suzuki M50 | Standard | 1 |
| Suzuki SV650 | Sport | 1 |
| Suzuki M50 | Standard | 1 |
| Yamaha | Standard | 3 |
| Yamaha 600 | Sport | 1 |
| Yamaha Fazer 1000cc | Sport | 1 |
| Yamaha R-1 | Sport | 1 |
| Yamaha YZ5R | Sport | 1 |
| Yamaha YZF-R6 600cc | Sport | 1 |
| Unknown | | 6 |
| Grand Total | | 48 |

Fatal POV Motorcycle Accidents *

01 Oct 05 - 30 Sep 06

| Age | Total Fatal |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| 18 | 1 |
| 20 | 6 |
| 21 | 2 |
| 22 | 3 |
| 23 | 4 |
| 24 | 2 |
| 25 | 4 |
| 26 | 3 |
| 27 | 1 |
| 28 | 1 |
| 30 | 4 |
| 31 | 1 |
| 32 | 1 |
| 33 | 3 |
| 35 | 2 |
| 36 | 1 |
| 38 | 1 |
| 42 | 2 |
| 46 | 2 |
| 47 | 2 |
| 51 | 1 |
| 59 | 1 |
| Grand Total | 48 |

| Cause | Total |
|---|--------------|
| Alcohol | 4 |
| Crossed Centerline | 1 |
| Failed to Yield | 2 |
| Improper passing | 1 |
| Inattentiveness | 2 |
| Lost Control | 6 |
| No Fault | 2 |
| Other Veh Failed to Yield | 6 |
| Other vehicle failed to stop at four way intersection | 1 |
| overconfident | 1 |
| Speed, lost control | 1 |
| Speed | 11 |
| Speed & Alcohol | 1 |
| Speed & Inattentiveness | 1 |
| Unk | 8 |
| Grand Total | 48 |

| Rank | Total Fatal |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| PV1 | 1 |
| PV2 | 2 |
| PFC | 5 |
| SPC | 9 |
| SGT | 10 |
| SSG | 8 |
| SFC | 6 |
| 1SG | 2 |
| SGM | 1 |
| LTC | 1 |
| CPT | 2 |
| WO1 | 1 |
| Grand Total | 48 |

60% of reported Enlisted fatalities were SGT or above.

There have been 3 reported Commissioned Officer fatalities to date*

* Fatalities are Army Military Data as of 02 Oct 06. Based on casualty reports, telephonic notifications

Fatal POV Motorcycle Accidents *

01 Oct 05 - 30 Sep 06

| MACOM | PLR_UNIT | STATE | TOTAL |
|--------------|--|--------------|--------------|
| FORSCOM(28) | 10 MTN DIV | LA | 1 |
| | 1 st ARM DIV | TX | 1 |
| | 1 ST CAV DIV | LA(1),TX(3) | 4 |
| | 2 nd INF DIV | CO | 1 |
| | 3 RD ACR | CO | 1 |
| | 3 RD INF DIV | GA(5),MS(1) | 6 |
| | 4 th INF DIV | TX | 1 |
| | 75 th DIV | TX | 1 |
| | 82 nd ABN DIV | NC | 4 |
| | 91 st DIV | WA | 1 |
| | 66 BDE | WA | 1 |
| | ATSCOM | AL | 1 |
| | III CORP | OK(1),TX(1) | 2 |
| | USAR | AK(1),IN(1) | 2 |
| | XVIII ABC | NC | 1 |
| INSCOM(2) | 513 MIBD | GA | 1 |
| | 470 MIBD | TX | 1 |
| MEDCOM(2) | WRAIR | MD | 1 |
| | 1 ST AND 3 rd INF BN | VA | 1 |

| | | | |
|--------------|--------------------------|--------------|-----------|
| DASTAFF(1) | OSD | TX | 1 |
| NGB(4) | MO NG | MO | 1 |
| | NC NG | NC | 1 |
| | WI NG | WI | 1 |
| | LA NG | LA | 1 |
| TRADOC(5) | 4 th TBDE | SC | 1 |
| | INF TBDE | GA | 1 |
| | NTC | CA | 1 |
| | USACC | AZ | 1 |
| | USAREC | AZ | 1 |
| USAREUR(3) | 1 st ARM DIV | Germany | 1 |
| | 1 st INF DIV | Germany | 1 |
| | 21st SPCMD | KY | 1 |
| USARPAC(2) | 25 th INF DIV | HI(1),FL(1) | 2 |
| USASOC(1) | 1 st SFWG | SC | 1 |
| TOTAL | | | 48 |

* Fatalities are Army MilitaryData as of 02 Oct 06. Based on casualty reports, telephonic notifications &

PRELIMINARY LOSS REPORT 0642

MOTORCYCLE CRASH CLAIMS 1 SOLDIER'S LIFE – ACCIDENT

An 82nd Airborne Division Soldier was killed in a motorcycle accident on 1 December 2005 at 2342 local at Fort Bragg, NC. The 26-year-old SGT was traveling at a high rate of speed and failed to keep his Harley Davidson Custom Sportster motorcycle within the limits of his lane. The rider struck a barricade and was separated from his motorcycle. The SGT sustained massive head injuries and was pronounced dead at the scene. The NCO was wearing a helmet that was not approved by the Department of Transportation (DOT). He was not wearing a reflective vest or belt, however, he was wearing a leather jacket, gloves, and over the ankle boots.

Including this accident, there were **15** Class A-C Army Privately Owned Motorcycle and All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) accidents in FY06 compared to **150** in all of FY05. These **15** accidents have resulted in **6** fatalities compared to **45** Soldier deaths in all of FY05.

Don't let this happen in your formation. Consider these actions to help prevent similar motorcycle accidents:

- ✓ Speeding kills. Operate your motorcycle according to your experience level and always within legal limits.
- ✓ Ensure Soldiers wear DOT approved helmets (IAW DODI 6055.4, page 12, Enclosure 3, para E3.2.7.1.1).
- ✓ Remind Soldiers that high risk times for accidents are between the hours of 2300 and 0500.

* Preliminary Loss Reports (PLR) are provided to leaders for awareness, trends, and TTPs. Our Army depends on you to disseminate PLRs to the lowest levels of your formation in order to help high risk troops understand the impact of decisions made on and off duty.


The U.S. ARMY COMBAT READINESS CENTER is interested in your comments; please [click here](#) to provide feedback on the Preliminary Loss Reports (PLR). [FAQs](#)

AIR

Trends

- Enduring: Aircrew coordination failures
- Enduring: Inadequate mission planning
- Overarching: Assumption of low risk
- Recent: Indiscipline


Everywhere Else: 175



Initiatives

- **Aircrew Coordination Training-Enhanced (ACT-E)**
 - Working with USAAWC to develop and field by Feb 07
- **Pre-Mission Planning**
 - Working to consolidate/synchronize aviation mission planning systems under single PM and integrate ULLS-A data
 - Teamed with PEO-Avn to develop/field CAFRS, with crew selection risk management tool
- **Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA)**
 - Teamed with USAAWC and PEO-Avn to determine requirements for Aircraft Data Exploitation Capability (ADEC)
- **Emphasizing leader accountability at the appropriate level for incidents involving willful misconduct**
- **Increasing leader awareness of hazards involving low-risk missions**

USCENTCOM: 68



As of 01 Oct 06


Army Aircraft Losses

FY02–Present

As of 27 Sep 06

Hostile/
Non-Hostile

AH-64A/D



8/42
(\$1.04B)

U/MH-60L



12/22
(\$191.8M)

C/MH-47



6/13
(\$718.9M)

OH-58D



8/21
(\$181.2M)

→ Total

132 Aircraft Removed/Pending Removal from Army Inventory: \$2.17B in Replacement Costs

34/98

210 Fatalities: 130 non-hostile, 80 hostile

Mission: Multi-Aircraft Night Counter Mortar MANPAD Rocket Interdiction with NVG Aircraft Qualification Training

Hazards

- Inadequate mission planning
- Zero illumination
- Unfamiliar area
- Combat spread formation at night
- Inadequate composite risk management
- Inadequate standards
- Failure to adhere to standards
- Improper aircraft lighting configuration
- Lack of NVG mission training & proficiency
- Overconfidence
- Inadequate supervision



Results

- 2 Fatalities
- 1 Aircraft destroyed
- 1 Aircraft significantly damaged
- ECOD \$30,050,000

Controls

- Thorough mission planning / briefing
- Composite risk management (tactical / accidental risks)
- Follow standards / written procedures
- NVG academic training prior to flight training
- Base task training prior to mission task training
- Mixed system (NVS / NVG) & NVG considerations

AH64 Mid - Air



SEARCH
the USACRC knowledge base:

Go

**PROGRAM QUICK LINKS**

--- Quick Links ---

- ABOUT USACRC & ARMY SAFETY
- ACCDT REPORTING & INVESTIGATION
- AWARDS PROGRAM
- BEST PRACTICES / LESSONS LEARNED
- CONTACTS / LINKS
- COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT
- DRIVING / POV
- GUIDANCE / POLICY / MESSAGES
- MULTIMEDIA
- STATS / REPORTS
- TRAINING
- WORKSHEETS / CHECKLISTS / TOOLS

PRELIMINARY LOSS REPORTS

View All - AKO Login Required

**MOTORCYCLE CRASH CLAIMS 1
SOLDIERS LIFE**

A 21st Theater Support Command, USAREUR Soldier died on 7 July 2006 at 0840 from injuries sustained in a motorcycle crash on 05 July 2006 at 0800 local in Wallins, Kentucky. The 30-year-old SGT, who was leave...

more>>

U.S. ARMY COMBAT READINESS CENTER

The USACRC is a knowledge center that "connects the dots" on all loss. Utilizing Composite Risk Management, we can better protect our assets and "Own the Edge".

Own The Edge

[Web Tools Overview](#) [Loss Reporting](#) [Assessment Tools](#) [Stats/Reports](#)
USACRC Automated Tools

Our online tools can help keep you safe. Please use the tabs above to access them or learn more. Tools include:

- [POV Risk Assessment Tool \(ASMIS-2\)](#)
- [Army Readiness Assessment Program \(ARAP\)](#)
- [RMIS and RMIS Quick Search](#)
- [ASMIS-1 Risk Assessment Tool](#)
- [Loss Reporting Automation System \(LRAS\)](#)

WHAT'S HOT

RSS

① **SAFETY SENDS #16**

As we begin the final quarter of FY06, the efforts of commanders in the field have enabled the Army to reduce accidental loss by 20% from FY05. This is the first decrease since before 9/11. My hat is off to you!

② **"DIRTY JOBS" VIDEO SERIES AVAILABLE**

Mike Rowe, host of Discovery Channel's "Dirty Jobs", recently explored some of the Army's dirty jobs at Fort Jackson, S.C. While filming, Rowe learned to "Own the Edge" through Composite Risk Management.

③ **GOT RISK? POSTERS**

Week of 29 June - 05 July, 2006 - View weekly summaries of Army losses and help communicate trends and promote Composite Risk Management.

[Archives>>](#)**RECENT SITE UPDATES & ADDITIONS**

- ④ [CELL PHONES COMPETE FOR DRIVERS' ATTENTION](#)
- ⑤ [STRATEGIC VISION: 2006 AND BEYOND](#)
- ⑥ [BOATING AND PERSONAL WATER CRAFT, OR PWC, SAFETY](#)
- ⑦ [KEEP YOUR HEAD ABOVE WATER](#)
- ⑧ [HYDRATE TO STAY IN THE FIGHT](#)

FEATURED ITEMS

- Commander's Safety Course
- Additional Duty Safety Officer
- Vehicle Accdt. Avoidance Crs.
- Many More Courses...

Get your training today!

NAVY History

300+ Units' Overall Climate Scores

| | Top Quartile | Mid-High Quart | Mid-Low Quart | Lowest Quartile |
|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Class A | 14 | 11 | 19 | 28 |
| Total Mishaps | 51 | 68 | 84 | 113 |

ARAP Statistics

as of 22 September 06

Total Flagged Battalions

586 AD

513 NG

230 USAR

1,329

Total number of units & personnel enrolled in ARAP

804 Battalions

260,604 Personnel

Total number of units & personnel complete

313 Battalions

92,997 Personnel

| Mean Score (Out of Five) | Dollar Cost | Class A |
|-----------------------------|-------------|---------|
| Top Quartile 4.04 | 1.2M | 4 |
| Bottom Quartile 3.46 | 10.5M | 9 |



What is it?

ARAP is a Web-based initiative that provides battalion-level commanders with data on their formation's readiness posture through five segments:



- **Processes Auditing** — assesses the processes used to identify hazards and correct problems
- **Reward Systems** — assesses the unit's program of rewards and discipline to reinforce proper behavior and correct risky actions
- **Quality Control** — places emphasis on [...more](#)

Take a Look



Introduction



Taking an Assessment



Commander Access Module

How to Sign Up

1 Register for Assessment Code

The Battalion Commander or his/her representative calls to conduct the unit registration process and in briefing with a member of the Combat Readiness Center (CRC) ARAP team.

(334) 255-9362/9577 -or- DSH 558-9362/9577

The Battalion Commander or his/her representative can also initiate the pre-registration by clicking [here](#) and filling out the registration form. The unit will then be contacted by a member of the ARAP Team.

2 Receive Codes

The Battalion Commander or his/her representative receives an in briefing consisting of program description, complete the registration of the unit, a commander's "Totals only ID" to track the unit's progress, individual numeric codes for each Soldier in the unit to take the assessment, a briefing on due outs at the completion of the assessment and an answer to any questions

3 Manage Assessment

Distribute the assessment codes to the unit, maintaining anonymity of the soldiers.

[Enter Site ▶](#)






ARMY READINESS ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (ARAP)

ARAP is a Web-based initiative that provides battalion-level commanders with data on their formation's readiness posture through five segments:

- **Processes Auditing**—assesses the processes used to identify hazards and correct problems
- **Reward Systems**—assesses the unit's program of rewards and discipline to reinforce proper behavior and correct risky actions
- **Quality Control**—places emphasis on high standards of performance
- **Risk Management**—assesses the health of unit processes
- **Command and Control**—assesses leadership, communication, and policies as they relate to Composite Risk Management (CRM)



Designed for use by battalion-sized units, the program asks several questions of battalion commanders. Wouldn't you like to know if your unit is about to experience a mishap? Wouldn't you like to prevent the loss of personnel and equipment? Don't you want to protect your combat power?

One of ARAP's goals is to identify and correct organizational conditions that could increase the potential for mishaps. Following survey administration (the assessment phase), the commander receives one-on-one feedback on key issues regarding command climate, safety culture, resource availability, workload, estimated success of certain safety intervention programs, and other factors relating to their unit's overall readiness.

So, what's in it for me?

- All assessments are **confidential**. Only unit commanders or their designated representatives and the CRC have access to results. A confidential debrief is conducted on a one-on-one basis between the commander and the CRC.
- Assessments **maybe predictive**. Studies conducted by the U.S. Navy over the past 6 years have shown that units in the survey's lower spectrum have twice the number of fatalities and more than twice the number of Class A accidents.
- All assessments and users are **anonymous**.
- These assessments are a "**free look**" inside a unit. They allow commanders to take an honest look at their safety culture and evaluate CRM processes.

The program is Web-based, quick, and easy.



OIF Assault Helicopter Battalion Feedback

Sustain


What the survey told me about my unit that I did not already know

Improve


What I thought I knew—and the survey confirmed

Plan of Action

FY05 Class A-C Army Accident Reports by Division



FY05 Class A Army Accidents By Division





Loss Reporting System



Loss Reporting Type

[ACCIDENT](#)[COMBAT](#)[OTHER](#)

Help



Checklist



FAQ's

About Loss Reporting

The Loss Reporting process is a lifecycle system designed to establish Risk Awareness. This lifecycle is supported by loss reports (which include but not limited to accident, combat, medical, criminal, suicide, and other force reducers), data analysis, and thorough informative proactive tools.

The U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center (USACRC) stands at the forefront of product conception and implementation. Combined with the vast resources of Federal Government datastructures, the CRC is leveraging loss information to construct an accurate diagnosis for preventive loss.





Loss Reporting System



Accident Reporting Stage

Help

About Accident Reporting Stages

Initial Notification



Checklist

Full Accident Report



FAQ's

Close Call



Tutorials

LRAS provides two automated tools to help you with the notification and reporting of an Army accident:

The **Initial Notification** tool will allow you to report an immediate notification of an Army accident online. The tool provides checklists to assist you in the collection of information needed by USACRC.

The **Accident Reporting Automation (ARAS)** is an online accident reporting tool which will enable you to provide the accident data more efficiently, more accurately, and in less time.

A **Close Call** is an accident that almost happened, so studying close-calls can help us understand safety problems and make corrective changes **before** an accident takes place!



U.S. ARMY COMBAT READINESS CENTER

Had a Close Call?

Welcome to Close Call.

This system is voluntary and completely anonymous!

Studies in several industries indicate that there are between 50 and 100 Close-Calls for every accident. Essentially, a close-call is an accident that almost happened. Close-calls and accidents have the same causes, so studying close-calls can help us understand safety problems and make corrective changes **before** an accident takes place!

This site is designed to collect information for analysis and the development of controls to lessen the likelihood of accidents.

[Click Here to submit an](#)

AVIATION

Close Call

[Click Here to submit a](#)

GROUND

Close Call

[Click Here to submit a](#)

DRIVING / POV

Close Call

GOT RISK?

<https://crc.army.mil>

PLRS
**Preliminary
LOSS REPORTS**
for the week of 7-13 Sept 2006

2

SOLDIERS
DIED IN
ACCIDENTS

• 4 Soldiers injured



► A Soldier was killed in a vehicle accident Sept. 7 at 2150 local in Sierra Vista, Ariz. The Soldier was driving a 2004 Toyota pickup through an intersection when a Jeep Cherokee collided with his vehicle. He was wearing his seat belt. Alcohol was reported as a factor with the Jeep Cherokee's occupants. Local authorities are investigating the accident.

COST: 1 Soldier Killed

► A Soldier was injured in a friendly-fire accident Sept. 7 at 2100 local in Iraq. The Soldier was the gunner of a M1114 HMMWV when he encountered friendly fire.

COST: 1 Soldier Injured

► A Soldier was killed in a single vehicle rollover accident Sept. 9 at 0128 local in Lacrosse, Wis. The Soldier was a passenger in a 2003 Ford Ranger. While exiting the interstate, the driver lost control of the vehicle, causing it to roll and come to a stop in a residential backyard. The driver is currently


LOSSES

being held on charges. Local authorities are investigating the accident.


COST: 1 Soldier Killed

► Three Soldiers were injured in a vehicle accident Sept. 8 at 1100 local in Lamar County, Miss. The Soldiers were traveling through an intersection when another vehicle ran a red light and impacted the driver's side of the vehicle. One Soldier was pinned and had to be cut out of the vehicle.

COST: 3 Soldiers Injured



U.S. ARMY COMBAT READINESS CENTER



Leading On the Edge

Get into a
new frame
of mind.

*Own the Edge through
Composite Risk Management*

own the
EDGE

Composite Risk Management





FATAL ACCIDENT of SGT ADAM L. CANTRELL

1-82 ARB, 82ND CAB

Briefer: CPT AARON D. ASHLEY



- **SGT CANTRELL'S HISTORY**
- **FACTS AND EVENTS PRIOR TO DEATH**
- **CONTRIBUTING FACTORS**
- **EFFECTS ON THE FAMILY AND TO THE UNIT**
- **LESSONS LEARNED**
- **QUESTIONS**



SGT CANTRELL'S HISTORY

- ENLISTED IN OCTOBER 1997 AS AN INFANTRYMAN
- SERVED AT FT. CAMPBELL FOR FOUR YEARS
- BECAME AN AH-64 ATTACK HELICOPTER CREW CHIEF ASSIGNED TO CAMP HUMPHREY, KOREA FEB 2002
- ASSIGNED TO FORT BRAGG IN FEB 2003
- DEPLOYED TO OEF WITH 3-229TH AHR in 2003
- DEPLOYED TO FORT HOOD, TX FOR A NINE MONTH UNIT FIELDING TRAINING PROGRAM (UFTP)
- RETURNED FROM UFTP 28 APR 2006
- DIED 0048 HOURS ON 29 APRIL 2006



FACTS AND EVENTS PRIOR TO DEATH

- **SGT CANTRELL DEPARTED COLUMBIA, SC 281300APR06 ON THE LAST LEG OF HIS AVIATION SUPPORT MISSION DESTINED FOR FT. BRAGG**
- **HE ARRIVED FIVE HOURS AFTER THE BATTALION'S MAIN BODY WAS RELEASED.**
- **HE RETURNED TO FT. BRAGG 281700APR06 AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED AROUND 1745 WITHOUT HAVING RECEIVED A CHAIN OF COMMAND SAFETY BRIEFING.**
- **SGT CANTRELL AND HIS FAMILY ATTENDED A SUBORDINATE'S PARTY ALONG WITH ANOTHER NON COMMISSIONED OFFICER AND TWO OTHER SUBORDINATES 281900APR06**
- **AT AROUND MIDNIGHT SGT CANTRELL, AFTER CONSUMING TWO BEERS AND TWO LONG ISLAND ICE TEAS (EQUIVALENT TO 12 ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES), MADE AN IRRESPONSIBLE DECISION.**



FACTS AND EVENTS PRIOR TO DEATH

- **SGT CANTRELL AND THE HOST BEGAN TAKING TURNS RIDING THE MOTORCYCLE BACK AND FORTH DOWN THE STREET AT A HIGH RATE OF SPEED.**
- **SGT CANTRELL WAS NOT LICENCED FOR A MOTORCYCLE, AND WAS NOT WEARING ANY PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE).**
- **ON THE LAST TURN OF HIS RIDE, SGT CANTRELL LOST CONTROL AND “DUMPED” THE MOTORCYCLE DOING APPROXIMATELY 80 MPH.**
- **HIS UNPROTECTED HEAD STRUCK A STONE NEAR A DRIVEWAY AT APPROXIMATELY 0048 HOURS.**
- **THE IMPACT SPLIT THE PARATROOPERS SKULL, LEAVING HIS BRAIN LYING ON THE GROUND IN SEVERAL PIECES.**

A dark, grainy photograph of a night scene. In the upper right, a tall street lamp illuminates a parking lot area. Several green and yellow structures, possibly tents or canopies, are visible in the background. The foreground is mostly black.

2003/03/15



2003/03/15



YAMAHA

DE BOX II

JAN 467 C/MF
09



CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- NO UNIT SAFETY BRIEFING BEFORE BEING RELEASED FOR THE WEEKEND
- EXCESSIVE SPEED
- NO PPE
- EXCESSIVE ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
- FELLOW PARATROOPERS DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION
- NOT PROPERLY LICENCED
- NO MOTORCYCLE DEFENSIVE DRIVING COURSE CERTIFICATE



EFFECTS ON THE FAMILY AND TO THE UNIT

- **SGT CANTRELL'S WIFE, SON (AGE 6), AND DAUGHTER (AGE 4) WITNESSED HIS DEATH.**
- **SGT CANTRELL'S AIRBORNE BUDDIES PRESENT AT THE SCENE FELT RESPONSIBLE AND SHARED IN THE FAMILY'S GRIEF.**
- **THE DECISION FOR THE LINE OF DUTY INVESTIGATION IS PENDING FROM DA. ALL VETERAN'S AFFAIRS BENEFIT'S FOR HIS FAMILY ARE ON HOLD.**
- **THE UNIT FELT SHOCK AND DISBELIEF, THEIR PREVIOUS NINE MONTH DEPLOYMENT WAS SUCCESSFUL, AND THERE WERE THANKFULLY NO FATAL ACCIDENTS.**
- **BROUGHT MORALE UNNECESSARILY LOW PRIOR TO AN UPCOMING OIF DEPLOYMENT.**



LESSONS LEARNED

- THE BATTALION LEADERSHIP NOW ENSURES EACH AND EVERY TROOPER RECEIVES A SAFETY BRIEFING PRIOR TO RELEASE.
- THE BATTALION'S LEADERSHIP RE-EMPHASIZED THE FIRST SUPERVISOR'S CRUCIAL ROLE REGARDING CONDUCTING SAFETY BRIEFING'S TO SUBORDINATES.
- THE BATTALION LEADERSHIP CONDUCTED A BATTALION WIDE BRIEFING WHERE THE COMMANDER STRESSED OUR EXISTING POLICIES REGARDING NOT OPERATING MOTOR VEHICLES UNDER THE INFLUENCE, OR WITHOUT UTILIZING PROPER PROTECTIVE GEAR.
- THE BATTALION LEADERSHIP ALSO STRESSED TO EVERYONE THE IMPORTANCE OF AIRBORNE BUDDIES TAKING INITIATIVE AND STOPPING AN UNLAWFUL, OR IRRESPONSIBLE ACT FROM OCCURRING WHEN THEY HAVE THE ABILITY TO DO SO.




For Official Use Only

QUESTIONS

82nd Airborne Division

For Official Use Only



1-9 Infantry Regiment Fort Carson, CO


M2 .50 Caliber Machine Gun
Negligent Discharge

08 June 2006


Agenda

- Unit Organization / Background
- Phases
 - Pre-accident Timeline
 - Accident Timeline
- Findings / Results from CRC Board, corroborated with NCO Fatality Board,
15-6 investigations

Unit Organization



Unit Background



UNIT: E FSC 2nd BSB / A/1-9 IN, 2nd BCT

EQUIPMENT: M2 .50 Cal Machine Gun

DATE/TIME: 8 June 2006/0916 MST

LOCATION: Fort Carson Military Reservation

RESULTS: 1 Fatality and 3 Injuries

MISSION: Bayonet Strike - Company Live
Fire
Exercise

Pre-accident (Timeline)

| | |
|---|---|
| 30 May 06 support Exercise) | E FSC 2nd BSB deployed to FOB Wilderness in of Bayonet Strike (Division Level |
| 2 Jun 06 fire | A/1-9 IN conducted day blank and live |
| 3 Jun 06 | 2100-2330 A/1-9 IN conducted night dry fire |
| 4 Jun 06 | 0100-0330 A/1-9 IN conducted night live fire |
| Day and for next live fire event | A/1-9 IN returned back to Garrison for refit preparation |

Pre-accident (Timeline)

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| 6 Jun 06 | |
| 0900 | A/1-9 IN returned back to FOB Wilderness |
| 1500 IN AO | Two M2 .50 Cal w/gunners from E FSC arrived at A/1-9 |
| 7 Jun 06 | |
| 0900 | A/1-9 IN conducted dry fire exercise prior to Demo |
| 0915 | 2LT Lee's M2 .50 Cal gunner replaced by PFC Nash |
| 1320 | A/1-9 IN conducted live fire exercise |
| 1500 .50 Cal | 2LT Lee (PL at SBF 3) directed PFC Nash to clear M2 |
| 1502 | 2LT Lee directed CPL Barnes to inspect the M2 .50 Cal |
| 1540 | A/1-9 IN conducted AAR on objective |
| 1620 | A/1-9 departs Range 141A back to FOB Wilderness |
| 1630 | CPL Hill and PFC Nash depart A/1-9 area |
| 1640 | CPL Hill and Nash return M2 .50 Cal to E FSC fuel tent |

Timeline (Accident)

8 Jun 06

0910
the M2
M998


0915
Cal
rear of the


0916
hip and

SFC Casey directed members of the platoon to move .50 Cal weapons from the fuel tent to the

PV2 Madison and SPC Vandenhouten carry two M2 .50 weapons from the fuel tent and placed them into the M998


PV2 Madison pushes weapon into the vehicle with his the weapon discharges a round





FOB WILDERNESS

E FSC, 2D BSB AREA OF OPERATION





Post (Accident Phase)

8 Jun 06

0916 First responders provided first aid to PV2 Madison and others

**0918 First 911 call received Colorado Springs operator and
dispatched to Ft Carson Emergency Communications Center
(ECC)**

0921 Engine 33 and Ambulance 3 responded

**0922 Range control activated the MAST Hot Loop and Flight for Life
(FFL) was put on standby**

**0923 Ambulance 3 requested additional ambulance support after
situational update**

0928 Ambulance 3 arrived at accident site and FFL was launched

0932 Captain from Engine 33 requested ETA for FFL

0935 FFL contacted ECC and estimated the ETA to be six minutes

**0937 EMS at site determined that ground transport by ambulance of
casualties would be faster so FFL was cancelled**

0952 Ambulance 3 arrived at Memorial Hospital, Madison coded enroute

1002 PV2 Madison pronounced dead

FINDING 1 (Weapon Improperly Cleared):

After completion of a company live-fire exercise, the gunner, a PFC, improperly cleared his HMMWV-mounted M2 .50 Cal machine gun. That is, **the gunner did not visually inspect the chamber and T-slot for rounds in contravention to TM 9-1005-213-10, FM 3-22.65 and other Army weapons clearing procedures.** The next day as two Soldiers were loading the machine gun onto a truck to transport it to the range, the weapon fired.

FINDING 2 (Inadequate Supervisory Execution of Responsibilities):

While performing supervisory duties on a live-fire range, the vehicle driver and the Truck Commander (TC) **failed to properly inspect the vehicle-mounted M2 .50 Cal machine gun after the gunner cleared it.** That is, **after being ordered by the company commander** to ensure the M2 .50 Cal was cleared, the supervisors' required to accomplish that task failed to ensure the weapon was properly cleared IAW range regulations, TM 9-1005-213-10, FM 3-22.65 and other Army guidance.

FINDING 3 (Incorrect Weapons Handling and Transportation):


Once the weapon was returned to the assigned company area, supervisors allowed procedures violation. That is, they **failed to ensure the weapon was properly cleared** in accordance with TM 9-1005-213-10 before storing the weapon overnight and transporting the weapon the following day. In addition to **storing the weapon fully assembled (barrel was still on)**.

FINDING 4 (Incorrect Clearing Procedures)

While loading weapons into an M998 HMMWV, two soldiers improperly handled an M2 .50 Cal machine gun. That is, prior to transporting the weapons, they **failed to ensure the fully assembled M2 .50 Cal machine gun was cleared in accordance with TM 9-1005-213-10.**

Corrective Actions:

- Updated FC Reg 350-1, dated 30 AUG 06 as a result of the accident.
- Implemented Leader Retraining Certification Program throughout 2BCT, 2ID, before resumption of training.
- BDE CDR conducted leader sensing sessions to address and reinforce leader responsibilities.





QUESTIONS ?